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Purpose  
The paper investigates the relationship between company specific factors and the extent of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) disclosures.    
 
Design/Methodology/Approach 
The study is based on a sample of 210 FTSE 350 companies and uses the disclosure index to 
quantify GHG disclosures made in the annual reports, sustainability reports and websites in 
2011. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is employed to model the relationship 
between the company specific factors and the extent of GHG disclosures.  
Findings 
The results indicate that company size, gearing, financial slack and two industries (consumer 
services and industrials) are significantly associated with GHG disclosures while 
profitability, liquidity and capital expenditure are not. When we disaggregate GHG 
disclosures into qualitative and quantitative, our results suggest that the effect of some 
company factors differ depending on the type of GHG disclosures. 
Research limitations/implications 
The study is cross sectional. A longitudinal study is necessary to understand the dynamics of 
GHG disclosures as firms may change their disclosure policy as the importance of GHG 
increases. The results imply that policy makers need to take into account certain company 
specific factors when formulating policy aimed at improving GHG disclosures.  
Originality/Value 
The results add evidence to the growing body of research focussing on relationship between 
company specific factors and GHG disclosure. The study also provides evidence that the 
effect of some company specific factors on GHG disclosures differ depending on whether the 
GHG disclosures are quantitative or qualitative. 
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1. Introduction 
There is growing evidence that firms are managing and reporting their greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions voluntarily in a bid to signal their green credentials (Rankin et al., 2011; 
Peters and Romi, 2013). In view of such evidence, this paper investigates the extent to which 
UK listed companies disclose information relating to GHG gases. In addition the study 
examines whether company specific factors determine the extent of GHG disclosures. The 
research is mainly motivated by two reasons. The first reason is the need to add evidence on 
whether company specific factors determine the extent of GHG disclosures given the 
contradictory nature of existing research results. For example, gearing was found to be 
significant by Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) and Cotter and Najar (2011) but 
insignificant by Freedman and Jaggi (2005) and Rankin et al. (2011).  Similarly, profitability 
was found to be insignificant by Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009), Peters and Romi (2011), 
Rankin et al. (2011), and Cotter and Najar (2011) but significant by Prado-Lorenzo and 
Garcia-Sanchez (2010).  
 The second reason motivating our research is the need to respond to calls for more 
research in this area. For example, due to the conflicting nature of existing studies, Gray et al. 
(2001) and De Villiers and van Staden (2011), among others, suggested the need for more 
research on the factors influencing environmental reporting in general and GHG specifically. 
These studies indicate that the existing studies are inconclusive owing to many limitations 
and hence called for more research in this area. This study is therefore part of the response to 
those calls. The need for more understanding of company specific determinants of GHG 
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disclosure needs no emphasis as it can help shape or inform policy on promoting corporate 
transparency and accountability on GHG emissions. 
Compared to previous studies, our study is different in that it evaluated GHG 
disclosures in annual, sustainability and website reports unlike the majority of studies which 
solely focussed on Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) reports (Liao et al 2014; Peters and 
Romi 2013). We argue that the motivation for disclosure through CDP or participation in 
CDP may not necessarily be the same as that for disclosure through annual and sustainability 
reports since the CDP is primarily driven by investors whereas the annual report is a legal 
document where disclosure priority is shaped by a diverse range of stakeholders. In addition, 
we have also extended our investigation to determine whether the disclosure differs 
depending on the type of GHG information disclosed i.e. qualitative or quantitative.  By 
disaggregating the GHG disclosures into qualitative and qualitative we provide 
comprehensive and richer insights into disclosure quantity (see Beattie et al., 2004) and this 
helps to profile different disclosure strategies employed by firms (Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004). Finally, our research is also different from previous GHG disclosure studies in that it 
is drawn from GHG disclosure items recommended for disclosure by a number of GHG 
voluntary frameworks. This evidence, to our knowledge, has not been documented before. 
Liao et al. (2014) notes that there is a general call within the academic and professional 
community to develop an appropriate framework or index which can be used to assess the 
extent of GHG information disclosure and our study is partly contributing to that.   
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 is the literature review 
and hypotheses development. Section 3 discusses the research methodology. Section 4 
presents and discusses the findings of research. Finally, there is a summary and conclusion.   
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
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2.1 Theoretical framework and prior studies 
Voluntary disclosure of GHG information can be explained from theories focussing on 
information asymmetry (mostly agency and signalling theories) and social political 
perspective (mostly legitimacy and stakeholder theories) (Cho et al., 2012; Gray et al., 1995). 
At the heart of both agency and signalling theories is the information differentials that exist 
between two parties i.e. management and shareholders/investors with the latter possessing 
less information than the former (Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). In the circumstances, the 
former has the incentive to disclose more to the latter in a bid to narrow the differences since 
such information is vital for company valuation (Chen and Jaggi, 2000). However, disclosure 
of information comes with proprietary costs in the form of actual costs to disclosure as well 
as eventual consequences that accompany such disclosures (Guidry and Patten, 2012). 
Therefore, in accordance with these economics based theories, as they are also known (Cho et 
al., 2012), firms engage in voluntary disclosure when the potential benefits outweigh the 
costs and that such disclosures are made primarily for signalling purposes (Toms, 2002). In 
the circumstances, the information asymmetry based theories predict that those firms whose 
environmental performance and in this study GHG emissions reductions are superior to their 
counterparts would be motivated to disclose more as a way of setting themselves apart from 
the poor performers in the hope of gaining competitive mileage (Clarkson et al., 2008). 
 On the social political theories stream, legitimacy and stakeholders theories have been 
widely used to explain environmental and GHG disclosures. These theories argue that a 
firm’s survival or continued existence is a matter that goes beyond the remit of the 
relationship between the owners and management (Gray et al., 1995). Thus a firm’s 
continued approval for existence is granted by the society and other stakeholders that control 
resources (O’Donovan, 2002; Cormier et al., 2004). Therefore to ensure continued existence 
and good neighbourliness, firms are expected to operate within the bounds set by the society 
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otherwise they risk losing legitimacy. Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) explain that when 
activities are deemed environmentally sensitive and adverse then management will use 
disclosures to help redefine the public discourse on the subject matter and eventually change 
stakeholder opinion. However with respect to stakeholder theory, instead of just dealing with 
society as a whole, a firm is seen as having different negotiated contracts with various 
stakeholders so much so that its survival is dependent on it fulfilling its part of the bargain 
(Berthelot and Robert, 2012; Mitchell et al., 1997). Therefore based on the social political 
theories it is predicted that disclosure is an attempt by a firm to repair, restore or enhance its 
reputation/legitimacy in its society and among its stakeholders so much so that those firms 
deemed as poor environmental performers are expected to disclosure more information in a 
bid restore their image. Thus disclosure is used as a tool to manage public and social pressure 
exerted on the firm as a result of its actions (Neu et al., 1998; Cho and Patten, 2007).   
Based on both the information asymmetry and social political perspective theories, 
some studies have investigated the influence of company specific factors on GHG disclosure. 
For example, Freedman and Jaggi (2005) investigated whether company specific factors 
determine global warming disclosures by global public firms from polluting industries. They 
found that size had a positive and significant relationship with global warming disclosures 
but both profitability and gearing had no significant influence. Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) 
similarly investigated the relationship between company specific factors and GHG voluntary 
disclosures and found that size was a significant determinant but gearing and profitability 
were not. A study by Berthelot and Robert (2012) found that company size and profitability 
(measured by return on assets) were both positively and negatively associated with GHG 
disclosure. However, profitability (measured by stock yield) was not significant. Finally, 
studies by Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia Sanchez (2010) and Peters and Romi (2012) also 
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reported that company size was a significant determinant of GHG disclosure while leverage, 
growth and profitability were not.  
 
2.3 Hypotheses development 
2.3.1Company size 
Engagement in social and environmental activities and subsequent disclosures require 
substantial resources in terms of finance and skill. Large firms are deemed resource capable 
to meet the pollution abatement costs and related disclosure costs (Freedman and Jaggi, 
2005). In this case the underlying assumption is that large firms will disclose more 
information than small firms. The availability of resources is paramount when dealing with 
climate related issues which in most cases necessitates significant changes to the way a firm 
conducts its business. All GHG disclosure studies have found a significant positive 
relationship between company size and GHG disclosures (e.g. Rankin et al., 2011; Berthelot 
and Robert, 2012; Stanny, 2011). Consistent with both social political and economic based 
theories and the findings of empirical studies on GHG disclosures, we hypothesise that: 
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between company size and GHG disclosures 
 
2.3.2 Gearing 
Based on the tenets of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), managers in a highly 
geared company are expected to disclose more information in order to minimise the agency 
costs.  In fact, leverage is considered a measure of risk exposure by both equity holders and 
debt holders. In highly geared company, creditors are worried that if a firm is not properly 
monitored then there might be wealth transfer from them to shareholders. In this case, if not 
provided with adequate information, creditors find their own means of monitoring 
management behaviour which results in increased agency costs (Depoers, 2000). According 
to Jensen and Meckling (1976), managers increase their levels of disclosures in a highly 
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geared company as a way of minimising agency costs. Empirical GHG disclosure literature 
has produced mixed evidence. For example, Freedman and Jaggi (2005) concluded that 
creditors had no role in determining climate change disclosures while Prado-Lorenzo et al. 
(2009) found a negative and insignificant relationship between GRI based climate change 
disclosures and leverage. Similarly Rankin et al. (2011) did not find any significant 
relationship between GHG disclosures and leverage. Given the contradiction between 
theoretical predictions and empirical findings, our hypothesis is non-directional. We 
hypothesise that: 
H2: There is a significant relationship between gearing and GHG disclosures 
 
2.3.3 Profitability 
 Brammer and Pavelin (2008) noted that profitability provides managers with a pool of 
resources which can be used to absorb the costs of environmental disclosures. Others also 
argue that profitable firms are more exposed to the public than others and hence stakeholders 
may be interested in more disclosures as to how a firm is making its profits (Chithambo 2013; 
Berthelot and Robert 2012). Therefore faced with public pressure, profitable firms might use 
disclosures such as environmental disclosures to demonstrate their profitability case (Bewley 
and Li, 2000).  Disclosures in this respect could be a means of gaining public trust and 
legitimacy regarding their ways of making profits. Empirical results on how profitability 
affects greenhouse gases disclosures are mixed. For example, Prado-Lorenzo et al. (2009) 
found evidence of a significant negative relationship between profitability and GHG 
disclosures in respect of one measure of profitability but no significant relationship in respect 
of their second measure of profitability.  Freedman and Jaggi (2005) reported a non-
significant relationship between profitability and pollution disclosures. Nevertheless other 
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studies found a significant positive relationship (Berthelot and Robert, 2012). Based on the 
conflicting evidence therefore a non-directional hypothesis is drawn as follows: 
H3: There is a significant relationship between profitability and GHG disclosures 
 
2.3.4 Liquidity 
Liquidity denotes the ability of a firm to meet its short term liabilities. Based on signalling 
theory argument, a company with a high liquidity ratio is expected to disclose more 
information to distinguish itself from other companies with less favourable liquidity positions 
(Aly et al., 2010; Oyeler et al., 2003). However, the opposite may also be true if seen from 
the information asymmetry propositions of agency theory where firms with low liquidity 
positions may provide more information to satisfy capital market players and creditor 
demands (Aly et al., 2010). Prior evidence has been mixed. Oyeler et al. (2003) found that 
liquidity was a key determinant of internet financial reporting in New Zealand and that it had 
a positive significant relationship with voluntary disclosure. To the contrary, Aly et al. (2010) 
found that liquidity had no influence on internet reporting.  Based on the assertion that 
environmental related activities including disclosures may necessitate adequate liquid 
resources, we hypothesise that: 
H4: There is a significant positive relationship between liquidity and GHG disclosures 
 
2.3.5 Financial slack 
 The firm’s financial slack is expected to affect GHG disclosures because such firms are 
expected to channel more financial resources into environmental or climate change initiatives 
including disclosure (Kock et al., 2012). Financial slack has been found to enable firms to 
engage in new ventures which they could not engage in if no slack resources were available. 
Voss et al. (2008) found that as a firm’s environment became more threatening, firms with 
more resource slack were able to explore other new products. In this case, as climate change 
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has rapidly become an issue of strategic importance, we argue that resource slack will 
facilitate engagement in emission control activities such as reporting which would require 
substantial investment in systems and personnel skill. Brammer and Pavelin (2006) argued 
that the availability of slack resources also enables a firm to meet administrative costs 
associated with voluntary disclosure related decisions. We there hypothesise that: 
H5: There is a significant positive relationship between financial slack and GHG disclosures 
 
2.3.6 Capital expenditure 
A firm’s capital expenditure on property, plant and equipment may influence GHG 
disclosures since those with newer equipment are considered to have the capacity to manage 
their emissions well compared to those with older equipment (de Villiers and van Staden, 
2011). Thus firms with high levels of capital expenditure are expected to have newer 
equipment which would enable them to manage emissions and would therefore be willing to 
make more disclosures. Gao (2011) found that firms with an aggressive environmental 
strategy leading to more environmental related disclosures often invest in newer and 
operationally and environmentally more efficient equipment. Since investment in newer and 
less polluting technologies makes a firm appear more green friendly, management are bound 
to disclose more information related to this as a way of informing their stakeholders 
(Clarkson et al., 2011). We hypothesise that:     
H6: There is a significant positive relationship between capital expenditure and GHG 
disclosures 
 
2.3.7 Firm age 
Older firms are deemed well enough established to have resources to manage climate change 
issues compared to younger ones which might have other pressing issues. Besides, Roberts 
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(1992 p.605) argued that ‘reputation and history of involvement in social responsibility 
activities can become entrenched’ thereby making it hard for a firm to withdraw its 
commitment from these and or making stakeholders expect more from older firms based in 
previous experience. Others also argue that old firm have more time to establish extensive 
stakeholder networks such as research centers and other stakeholder who matter on various 
issues and hence can benefit from these networks to help set pace for disclosure (Alsaeed, 
2006; Kang and Gray, 2011). We hypothesise that: 
 H7: There is a significant positive relationship between firm age and GHG disclosures 
 
2.3.8 Industry  
Based on prior evidence, industries deemed as environmentally sensitive would disclose more 
information than those considered non-environmentally sensitive (Peters and Romi, 2013; 
Cho and Pattern 2007). Thus it is argued that environmentally sensitive industries are 
subjected to intense environmental regulation and scrutiny due to their high propensity to 
pollute and as such they are forced to comply with these regulations or act in a manner that 
will deter further stringent regulations. Consistent with stakeholder theory, the 
environmentally sensitive industries often come under pressure to demonstrate their green 
credentials from a diverse range of stakeholders. In this case, firms resort to more disclosure 
to manage these stakeholder expectations as non-disclosure may be interpreted as a signal of 
bad environmental performance (Clarkson et al., 2008; Gao et al., 2005). GHG disclosure 
studies that found positive and significant relationship include Rankin et al. (2011) and 
Freedman & Jaggi (2005). We therefore hypothesise that:  
H8: There is a significant relationship between a firm’s industry and GHG disclosures  
 
3. Research Methodology 
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3.1. Sample selection 
The population for the study is the FTSE 350 London Stock Exchange listed companies as at 
30th September, 2011. To arrive at our sample, 93 financial sector companies which include 
banks, insurance companies, investment trusts, unit trusts and real estate companies were 
excluded from the sample because they are subject to different disclosure and statutory 
requirements (Mangena and Tauringana, 2007) which can materially affect how other firm 
factors such as size and gearing are measured. Of the remaining companies, 257 firms, 47 
firms were excluded on the basis of either undergoing significant restructuring in the year or 
had no corporate office in the UK. This meant that our sample consisted of 210 companies.   
 
3.2. Quantifying GHGs disclosure 
Unlike previous studies (e.g. Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009) which based their list of disclosure 
index items on a single GHG disclosure guidance, we included all relevant items from several 
GHG reporting frameworks such as GHG Protocol (2004), DEFRA (2009), and Global 
Framework for Climate Risk Disclosure (2006). The final index had 60 items consisting of 34 
items relating to qualitative disclosures and 26 quantitative disclosures. To quantify the GHG 
disclosures made in the annual reports, sustainability reports and websites of the companies 
in 2011, content analysis technique was used. Literature suggests that the quantification of 
disclosure can either be done on a weighted or un-weighted basis. Gray et al. (1995) 
suggested that the adoption of either method does not materially alter the results. An un-
weighted approach has been adopted for this study which is most appropriate when no 
importance is given to any specific user groups. A company is awarded a score of ‘1’ for the 
disclosed item, and ‘0’ if not disclosed. However, the company is not penalised if the item 
does not apply. The total disclosure index score is then calculated for each sample firm as a 
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ratio of the total disclosure score divided by the maximum possible disclosure for the 
company. The disclosure index for each company is then expressed as a percentage.  
 
3.3.Econometric Modelling  
We used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to model the relationship between 
company specific factors and GHG disclosures. The estimated models are as follows:  
GHG DISx = β0 + β1Sizex + β2Gearingx + β3Profitabilityx + β4Liquidityx + β5Fslackx +  
 β6Capexx + β7Firmagex + β8Industryx +ε                                             
Where: 
GHG DISx is the GHG disclosure index obtained after analysing company x’s annual report, 
sustainability report and website. 
Sizex   is company x’s variable related to size measured by total assets; 
Gearingx  is gearing measured by dividing non-current liabilities by shareholders’ equity. 
Profitabilityx is profitability measured by dividing operating profit by total assets; 
Liquidityx is liquidity measured by dividing current assets by current liabilities 
Fslackx  is financial slack defined by cash and cash equivalents divided by total sales; 
Capexx is capital expenditure measured by dividing total capital expenditure by total
   sales; 
Firmagex  is firm age measured as the natural log of the number of years a firm has been 
publicly listed on LSE. 
Industryx is an industry dummy with 1 denoting a company’s industry otherwise 0                         
Β1-8  Coefficients 
ε  Residual 
β0  Constant 
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4. Results and discussion  
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the extent of GHG disclosure and the independent variables are 
presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 particularly focusses on the extent of disclosure with 
respect to the disclosure index used in this study. Overall, more qualitative disclosures are 
made compared to quantitative ones. On the qualitative disclosures, the most frequently 
reported item was the actions/measures taken to reduce/mitigate climate change impact with 
almost 95 per cent of the firms reporting this. This could suggest the desire on the part of the 
companies to shift focus of their target audience from their actual impact on climate change 
to intended actions. The least disclosed qualitative information was the supplier and the name 
of the purchased green tariff. The results also show that 71 per cent of firms disclosed their 
reporting framework guidelines while only 31 per cent disclosed that they had obtained 
assurance services on their GHG emissions reporting.   
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The most frequently reported quantitative item was the total GHG emissions in Co2 metric 
tonnes which was reported by 84 per cent of the companies. However, evidence indicates low 
levels of GHG quantitative disclosure per scope. For example, only 29 per cent of the firms 
reported their GHG emissions per scope 1. Dragomir (2012) reported similar findings and 
noted that a sample of companies comprising BP, Total, Shell, BG Group and Eni had largely 
disclosed GHG emissions in total rather than in scopes. Overall there was lack of quantitative 
information relating to future estimates of emissions and quantifiable estimates of regulatory 
risks arising from climate change.  
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According to Table 2, the mean GHG disclosure is 38.5 per cent, with a minimum of 
0 per cent and a maximum of 88.3 per cent, indicating a wide variation in the amount of GHG 
that companies disclose. Overall the mean disclosure of below 40.0 per cent also suggests 
that the extent of voluntary GHG disclosure by FTSE 350 is still low. When categorised into 
qualitative and quantitative disclosures, the results show that the means are 45.2 per cent and 
29.7 per cent respectively, with a range of 0 per cent to 100 per cent in each case.    
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In respect of the independent variables, Table 2 shows that firms’ size (measured by 
total assets) ranged from £51.5m to £345,257 million with a mean of £10,718.26 million 
which suggest that the firms are fairly large in terms of size. The average profitability 
(measured by return on assets) is 10.69% but the minimum is minus 16.13%. A mean gearing 
of 1.52 suggests that the sample is highly geared. It is also noticeable that with the exception 
of firm age, all the independent variables have high levels of kurtosis. However, Rankin et al 
(2011) argued that in large samples, the impact of skewedness and kurtosis values from 
normality is suppressed. In this case, therefore, the effect of the non-normal distribution in 
the independent variables is unlikely to affect the final outcome. 
The correlation matrix for both independent and dependent variables is presented in 
Table 3. As expected, GHG disclosure is positively related with size, financial slack and 
capital expenditure.  Gearing, profitability and liquidity are negatively correlated with GHG 
disclosures but none of them is significant.  
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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There are no significant correlations between independent variables with the highest 
being that of capital expenditure and firm age at 0.20 and this is considered no threat to 
multicollinearity as it falls below the maximum threshold of 0.8 or 0.9 as recommended by 
Field (2009). However although our correlation matrix does not depict very high correlations 
among the independent variables, we also analysed the variance inflation factors. According 
to Field (2009), low values of VIF are expected if multicollinearity problem is to be under 
control. Our mean VIF was 1.05 and the highest VIF was 1.10 for capital expenditure. This 
then means that multicollinearity is not prevalent in our model. 
4.2. Multiple regression results   
4.2.1. Multiple regression results 
Table 4 shows the results of our regression models of the relationship between the company 
specific factors and GHG disclosure. The R2 adjusted is 29.0 per cent for the overall model 
and the model is highly significant (F=16.16, p=0.006). Our results indicate that out of all the 
variables, size, gearing and financial slack are significantly associated with the extent of 
overall GHG disclosure which suggests that our hypotheses H1, H2 and H5 are supported. 
However, our hypothesis H8 is partially supported since only two industries (consumer 
services and industrials) are significantly associated with GHG disclosures.  The rest of our 
hypotheses (H3, H4, H6 and H7) are not supported.  In terms of the qualitative GHG 
disclosures, the results show a model explanatory power of 31%.  In this case, out of all 
variables, only company size, gearing and two industries (industrials and consumer services) 
are significantly associated with GHG disclosures.  
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
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The results in Table 4 also show that when the company specific factors are regressed against 
quantitative GHG disclosure, the model explains 22% of the variation in GHG disclosures.  
With this model only size, gearing, financial slack, capital expenditure and two industries 
(industrials and consumer services) are significantly associated with GHG disclosures.   
 
4.2.2 Discussion  
The results of a positive and significant relationship between company size and GHG 
disclosures are consistent with prior literature (Rankin et al., 2011; Berthelot and Robert, 
2012). Being a large company implies that it is more visible and subject to intense public 
scrutiny which then might force it to make more disclosures as a way of deflating criticism. 
But being large is also synonymous with being resource rich which may enable managers to 
exercise more flexibility in their disclosure decisions unlike small firms where resources are 
deemed to be in short supply (Rupley et al., 2012).  The negative but significant coefficient in 
respect of gearing means that highly geared companies are likely to disclose less information 
on GHG emissions. While the result contradicts findings of prior studies on GHG disclosures 
(see Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Rankin et al., 2011), it is consistent with the findings of 
Brammer and Pavelin (2008). This result could be seen in light of signalling theory in that 
low geared firms could be motivated to disclose more GHG information to signal to the 
market with the hope of tapping into the euphoria of attracting cheap capital through 
investors interested in socially and environmentally responsible firms. The non-significant 
results in respect of profitability are consistent with Freedman and Jaggi, (2005) and Rankin 
et al. (2011). The liquidity result, though not yet tested in GHG voluntary disclosure studies, 
is also comparable to other prior studies (e.g. Barako et al., 2006) who reported that liquidity 
does not influence extent of voluntary disclosure.  Our results also provide evidence that 
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availability of financial slack resources helps a firm to disclose more information on GHGs. 
This is consistent with Bowen (2001) who found that slack resources enable a firm to engage 
in some environmental initiatives. The finding on capital expenditure is particularly 
interesting in that when regressed with quantitative disclosures it is significant. This could 
suggest that for firms to make quantitative GHG disclosures there is need to invest in 
equipment and systems that will enable them to collect, measure and report GHG emissions 
(Ratnatunga and Balachandran, 2009).  
Consistent with Guidry and Patten (2012), the non-significance of half of the 
company specific factors investigated in this study may imply that the primary reason for 
GHG disclosure is not the information asymmetry problem aimed at the capital markets 
participants. Luo et al. (2012) documented evidence that the market did not exert significant 
influence on firms to provide more GHG information and hence suggest that more disclosure 
could be related to other stakeholders such as the government. The need to manage other 
stakeholders or a firm’s own legitimacy may take precedence over investors needs and this is 
corroborated by other studies that have surveyed practitioners on their motivation to provide 
more environmental information. For example, Cormier et al. (2004) through a survey found 
that the public were the highly ranked group seconded by investors/shareholders.  The 
ranking of shareholders/investors as being second to other interest groups when it comes to 
environmental disclosures render support to the social political theories and suggest that the 
information asymmetry based theories are of secondary importance. This is consistent with 
the notion that the salience of shareholder demands relating to GHG emissions information is 
not as urgent as that of government, NGOs and public (Sprengel and Busch, 2011).  
 
4.2.3 Robustness checks 
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The robustness of results was obtained through transformation of the industry variable. Prior 
studies (Rankin et al., 2011) categorise the industries differently and in this study our 
classification is primarily based on Industry Benchmark Classification which resulted in nine 
industries after excluding financial sector. Cho et al. (2012) noted that variations in industry 
classification might affect the results hence called for careful scrutiny as to how industry 
variables are included in models. We reclassify the industry variable into just one dummy 
variable (i.e. 1 for environmentally sensitive industry otherwise 0) using Times 1000 industry 
categorisation and then run the main regression model again (see Thompson,1998).  The 
results (not reported here but available on request) show that there is a minor change to the 
results in that the industry dummy becomes negative and non-significant. Apart from industry 
transformation, we also noticed that prior research proxied size and profitability with 
different measures hence we also re-ran our main model with different measures for size and 
profitability. Thus we use total revenue for size (instead of total assets) and return on equity 
for profitability (instead of ROA) and the results (not included here) are consistent with the 
main model.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
The study investigated whether company specific factors (company size, gearing, 
profitability, liquidity, financial slack, capital expenditure, age and industry) determine the 
extent GHG disclosures. Overall, the results suggest that only company size, gearing, 
financial slack are associated with GHG disclosures. When we disaggregate the GHG 
disclosures into qualitative and quantitative, the results suggest that the effect of some of the 
company specific factors differ depending on GHG disclosures type. Our results should be 
interpreted in the light of the following limitations. First, we used multiple sources of 
disclosure medium to derive or determine the extent of GHG disclosure which makes it 
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difficult to understand whether GHG disclosures are indeed made for signalling purposes or 
with capital market players as the main target. In this case we recommend that future research 
investigate different models based on disclosure medium. Second, the study is also limited in 
terms of time period as it only investigates one year. Thus the extent to which our results can 
be generalised is limited.   
Despite these limitations, our results contribute by providing further evidence on how 
company specific factors influence GHG disclosures. This is important because most 
disclosure studies form the basis of regulatory intervention hence it is prudent that policy 
based on research evidence should be grounded on. More importantly, our results contribute 
by providing evidence that the influence of some company specific factors on GHG 
disclosures differ depending on whether it is qualitative or quantitative.  Finally, the study 
also contributes to the understanding of the extent of GHG voluntary disclosure practices by 
UK firms in the context of the requirements of a number of GHG disclosure guidance. 
Although there is growing research on GHG disclosures (Rankin et al., 2011; Peters and 
Romi, 2012) most of it is based on other generic reporting frameworks like GRI (2006). It is 
therefore intimated that measuring GHG voluntary disclosures based on a number GHG 
disclosure guidance is more appropriate in that it will show the extent to which UK 
companies disclose internationally recommended GHG information on a voluntary basis.  
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Table 1: Consolidated Disclosure Scores for all companies  
  
 
Disclosure item 
 
    
Absolute 
Freq. Relative (%) 
 
Qualitative Disclosures 
  1 Institutional background 213 99% 
2 Period covered by the report 212 98% 
3 Statement on company position on climate change and related responsibilities 202 94% 
4 Corporate governance on climate change 191 88% 
5 Climate change opportunities and company strategies 137 63% 
6 Climate change impact on business operations including supply chains 111 51% 
7 Identification of regulatory risks as a result of climate change 67 31% 
8 Identification of all other risks as a result of climate change 92 43% 
9 Actions/measures taken to reduce/mitigate climate change impact 207 96% 
10 Adaptation strategies to climate change effects 103 48% 
     11 Regulated Schemes to which a firm belongs 79 37% 
12 Reporting Guidelines used in GHG reporting 135 63% 
13 An assurance statement on disclosed information 58 27% 
14 Contact or responsible person for GHG reporting 163 75% 
     15 Organisation boundary and consolidation approach 98 45% 
16 Base Year 126 58% 
17 Explanation for a change in base year 69 32% 
18 GHGs covered including those not required by Kyoto protocol 68 31% 
19 Sources and sinks used/excluded 88 41% 
20 Conversion factors used/methodology used to measure or calculate emissions 83 38% 
21 Explanation for any changes to methodology or conversion factors previously used 64 30% 
22 A list of facilities included in the inventory for GHG emissions 37 17% 
23 
Information on the quality of the inventory e.g. causes and magnitude of 
uncertainties in estimates 13 6% 
24 Information on any GHG sequestration 37 17% 
25 Disclosure of the supplier and the name of the purchased green tariff 13 6% 
     
26 
Explanations for changes in performance of total GHG emissions in Co2 metric 
tonnes 154 71% 
27 Explanation of any country excluded if global total is reported 111 51% 
     28 Explanations for changes in performance of scope 1 emissions 69 32% 
29 Details of any specific exclusion of emissions from scope 1 55 25% 
30 Explanation for the reason of any exclusion from scope 1 45 21% 
     31 Explanations for changes in performance of scope 2 emissions 65 30% 
32 Details of any specific exclusion of emissions from scope 2 53 25% 
33 Explanation for the reason of any exclusion from scope 2 44 20% 
     34 Explanations for changes in performance of scope 3 emissions 59 27% 
28 
 
     
     
 
Quantitative Disclosures 
  35 Total GHG emissions in Co2 metric tonnes 170 79% 
36 Comparative data of Total GHG emissions in Co2 metric tonnes 159 74% 
37 Future estimates of total GHG emissions in Co2 metric tonnes 15 7% 
38 GHG emission by business unit/type/country 123 57% 
39 GHG removals quantified in tonnes of Co2e 43 20% 
     40 Scope 1 emissions 63 29% 
41 Comparative data on scope 1 emissions 56 26% 
42 Future  estimates of scope 1 emissions 3 1% 
     43 Scope 2 emissions  62 29% 
44 Comparative data on scope 2 emissions 54 25% 
45 Future  estimates of scope 2 emissions 5 2% 
     46 Scope 3 emissions 50 23% 
47 Comparative data on scope 3 emissions 45 21% 
48 Future estimates of scope 3 emissions 3 1% 
     49 Emission of direct Co2 reported separately from scopes 95 44% 
50 Emission not covered by Kyoto and reported separately from scopes 95 44% 
51 
Emission attributable to own generation of electricity/heat/steam sold or transferred 
to another organ. 116 54% 
52 
Emission attributable to own generation of electricity/heat/steam purchased for 
resale to end users 63 29% 
53 For purchased green tariff state the reduction in tonnes of Co2e per year 17 8% 
54 Additional carbon saving associated with the tariff as a percentage 5 2% 
     55 Quantitative data estimates of the regulatory risks as a result of climate change 1 0% 
56 Quantitative data estimates of all other risks as a result of climate change 2 1% 
     
57 
GHG emission performance measurement against internal and external benchmarks 
including ratios 105 49% 
58 GHG emission targets set and achieved 139 64% 
59 GHG emission offsets information 48 22% 
60 Comparative information on targets set and achieved 133 62% 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics            
  
     
  
Variables Mean Std dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Disclosure - All 0.3851 0.2268 0.0000 0.8833 0.3992 2.079 
Qualitative Disclosure 0.4521 0.2378 0.0000 1.0000 0.411 2.172 
Quantitative Disclosure 0.2975 0.2336 0.0000 1.0000 0.4511 2.3998 
Size (£m) 10718.26 35289.84 51.5 345257 6.9671 58.8583 
Gearing 1.5328 12.0217 0.0338 173.9977 13.8651 198.2131 
Profitability 10.6954 11.0904 -16.136 120.388 4.791 46.6767 
Liquidity 1.6692 1.8633 0.2151 21.612 6.7751 65.9093 
Financial Slack 0.5383 4.6157 0.0008 52.894 10.4103 110.5513 
Capital Expenditure 0.1181 0.2494 0.0000 2.475 5.3127 41.9994 
Firm Age (Yrs) 25.0935 20.6457 1.0000 80.0000 0.8549 2.4953 
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Table 3: Correlation among dependent and independent variables         
  
         
  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.Disclosure - All 1.000 
        
  
2. Qualitative Disc. 0.971*** 1.000 
       
  
3. Quantitative Disc. 0.948*** 0.844*** 1.000 
      
  
4.Size 0.226*** 0.241*** 0.186** 1.000 
     
  
5.Gearing -0.056 -0.046 -0.065 -0.02 1.000 
    
  
6.Profitability -0.107 -0.099 -0.109 0.044 -0.037 1.000 
   
  
7.Liquidity -0.042 -0.036 -0.045 -0.07 -0.017 0.001 1.000 
  
  
8.Financial Slack -0.119 -0.113 -0.115 -0.03 -0.009 0.04 -0.019 1.000 
 
  
9. Capital Expenditure 0.085 0.055 0.12 -0.05 0.033 0.017 -0.066 0.037 1.000   
10.Firm Age 0.086 0.049 0.128 0.024 0.141** -0.07 -0.036 0.009 0.206*** 1.000 
***p<0.001, **p<0.05 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
Table 4: Multiple Regression results 
 
Disclosure - All Qualitative disclosure Quantitative disclosure 
 
        GHG Disclosure 
(DV) Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Err. Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Err. Coefficient 
Robust Std. 
Err. 
        Size 0.0846*** 0.0089 0.0945*** 0.0093 0.0718*** 0.0099 
 Gearing -0.002*** 0.0002 -0.002*** 0.0002 -0.002*** 0.0002 
 Profitability  0.0002 0.0009 0.0005 0.0010 -0.0003 0.0010 
 Liquidity 0.0065 0.0085 0.0078 0.0091 0.0048 0.0080 
 Financial Slack 0.0033** 0.0013 0.003 0.0016 0.0036*** 0.0009 
 Capital Expenditure 0.0907 0.0544 0.0633 0.0580 0.1264** 0.0529 
 Firm age 0.0072 0.0151 -0.0017 0.0158 0.0189 0.0156 
 Industrials 0.1832*** 0.0552 0.1962*** 0.0521 0.1665*** 0.0628 
 Consumer Services 0.1427** 0.0594 0.1370** 0.0566 0.1502** 0.0659 
 Oil & Gas 0.0622 0.0757 0.059 0.0789 0.0664 0.0766 
 Basic Materials 0.0855 0.0673 0.0604 0.0653 0.1183 0.0744 
 Consumer Goods 0.0854 0.0618 0.0837 0.0614 0.0877 0.0738 
 Telecommunications 0.0358 0.0950 -0.0427 0.0756 0.1386 0.1329 
 Utilities 0.1034 0.0780 0.0969 0.0717 0.1119 0.0890 
 Technology 0.0570 0.0621 0.068 0.0623 0.0427 0.0684 
 
        R-Squared 0.34 
 
0.36 
 
0.28 
  Adj. R-Squared 0.29   0.31   0.22     
***p<0.001, **p<0.05 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
